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ABSTRACT   
Earnings quality is information that can be determined by 
various factors, one of which is managerial ability. Thus, 
management quality itself can have a positive or negative 
impact on earnings quality, depending on the factors that 
affect their relationships. This study was conducted to re-
examine the effect of managerial ability on earnings 
quality by including corporate governance quality and 
ownership concentration as factors that are expected to be 
able to explain the inconsistencies in the results of 
previous studies. This study used the data of 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2010-2016 as study sample with total 
observations were 253. The analysis technique used for 
hypothesis testing was a multiple linear regression 
analysis. This study succeeds in proving the moderation 
role of governance quality in strengthening the 
relationship between managerial ability and earnings 
quality. However, the role of ownership concentration as 
moderator factors failed to prove in this study. 
Interestingly, there is a negative effect between managerial 
ability and earnings quality. The opportunistic actions 
taken by managers who want to meet their performance 
targets was considered as the reason of the negative effect 
between managerial ability and earnings quality. 
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 Does managerial ability enhance earnings quality? The moderating role of corporate governance  




Earnings quality is one of the important information regarding a company's financial 
performance that is relevant for certain decision-making (Dechow et al., 2010). This 
statement is in line with the study of (Harris et al., 2019) which proved that investors can also 
experience earning fixation, i.e. the tendency to be fixated on earnings information without 
considering other relevant information. 
Studies on earnings quality have also experienced very significant growth during the last 
two decades, especially the ones regarding the definition, measurement, and determinants of 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010; DeFond, 2010; Demerjian et al., 2013; Dichev et al., 
2013). While the majority of earning quality has focused on corporate characteristics, 
corporate governance, and audit quality (Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008; Gul et al., 2009; 
Dechow et al., 2010; Bryan et al., 2013). Dichev et al. (2013) identified the importance of the 
role of management in generating company earnings quality. Numerous empirical studies 
have found that managerial ability has a positive effect on earnings quality as the more-able 
managers are believed to be more able to deal with the complexities of operational decision 
making, generate more sales revenue, and enhances firm performances (Pan et al., 2015; 
Bonsall et al., 2017; Huang & Sun, 2017). However, Lobo & Zhou (2001), Shette et al. 
(2016), and Prakoso & Purwanto (2017) warned that greater earning management with the 
more opaque information environment may resulting in giving the managers opportunities to 
act opportunistically. Murniati et al. (2019) stated that earning management behavior could 
not be considered as profit manipulation as long as the process was done by following 
accounting standards.   
The result of a previous study regarding the role of managers and earnings quality 
indicates a study gap between managerial ability and earnings quality and raises the 
possibility of other factors that can explain the relationship between managerial ability and 
earnings quality, such as the supervisory function of managers. Good supervisory 
mechanisms, such as corporate governance quality, are expected to limit the opportunistic 
behavior of managers in carrying out their roles so that the quality of financial reports can 
improve (Mersni & Ben Othman, 2016; Marchini et al., 2018). Apart from supervision 
carried out through the corporate governance mechanism, several other mechanisms are 
important to consider, one of which is a company's ownership concentration (García Lara et 
al., 2009; Bao & Lewellyn, 2017; Lassoued et al., 2018). 
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Referring to the inconsistency of the effect of managerial ability and earnings quality and 
study that emphasizes the importance of supervisory mechanisms, which stated that an 
effective control system through representatives of the owners, the board of commissioners, 
and the audit committee can prevent agency conflicts that may arise when managers carry out 
their duties, it is important to re-examine whether differences in study results can be caused 
by other factors such as supervisory factors. Besides, a study on governance as a supervisory 
mechanism is also important to review due to the phenomenon of corporate governance 
strengthening that is being intensified by regulators, particularly within the context of 
Indonesia. Therefore, this study was conducted to re-examine the effect of managerial ability 
on earnings quality by including corporate governance quality and ownership concentration 




Agency theory is a theory that explains the agency relationship between one or more 
principal parties and other parties, namely agents who carry out a series of tasks that have the 
potential to create conflicts of interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Conflicts of interest 
between the principal and the agent can be caused by the role of the manager as an agent who 
has an incentive to obtain benefits and can harm the principal. To minimize these conflicts, 
the principal can supervise and provide incentives to agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Monitoring mechanisms for agents can be carried out in several ways, i.e. natural 
mechanisms, such as capital market pressures and corporate ownership structures, and 
institutional mechanisms, such as corporate governance (García Lara et al., 2009). Apart 
from corporate governance, efforts to reduce agency conflicts can also be carried out through 
supervision by the majority shareholder (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality 
Bertrand & Schoar (2003) concluded that managers have an important role in company 
performance. Several studies have shown inconsistent results related to managerial ability 
and earnings quality, such as Bolmiri et al. (2016) and Demerjian et al. (2013) who 
concluded that more capable managers can produce higher earnings quality. While other 
studies such as those by Djuitaningsih & Rahman (2012) show different results, which 
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indicate that the more reputable managers are, the more competent they are to produce fewer 
earnings quality.
 
Ge et al. (2011) added that managerial ability has a positive influence on earnings quality 
since they can determine policies that will affect the company, such as policies in 
discretionary accruals. Therefore, in addition to the positive influence, the negative impact of 
managerial ability can also occur when managers are motivated to meet performance 
expectations in various ways, including by managing earnings. Based on the explanation of a 
manager's influence on earnings quality, which can be positive or negative, the first 
hypothesis can be drawn as follows. 
H1:  Managerial ability affects earnings quality. 
Managerial Ability, Corporate Governance Quality, and Earnings Quality 
The inconsistency of the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality, as 
stated in the previous section, means that a capable manager does not necessarily guarantee 
the success of the company's performance because other factors can trigger these two factors, 
one of which is the supervisory mechanism by corporate governance quality (García Lara et 
al., 2009; Mersni & Ben Othman, 2016; Marchini et al., 2018). Piot & Janin (2007) 
concluded that the existence of an audit committee as part of corporate governance is proven 
to limit earnings management, something that may be done by managers. This study is in line 
with the research of Cohen et al. (2014) and Klein (2002) which explained that the existence 
of an audit committee with certain expertise and a more independent board structure can 
improve the quality of financial reporting or decrease earnings management. 
Some of these studies indicate that corporate governance, apart from having a 
supervisory role, also serves as a complement and support that strengthens the role of 
managerial ability. This is in line with Crossland & Hambrick (2007) study which shows that 
manager discretion is also determined by environmental conditions or organizational factors 
such as governance. This statement can be interpreted that companies with capable managers 
will be able to generate earnings quality if supported by reinforcing factors. Based on this 
explanation, a second alternative hypothesis can be formulated, i.e. that governance quality 
can strengthen the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. 
H2:  Corporate governance quality can strengthen the relationship between managerial 
ability and earnings quality. 
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Managerial Ability, Ownership Concentration, and Earnings Quality 
Conflicts of interest between agents and principals are expected to decrease in companies 
with concentrated ownership because it can facilitate more effective supervision and access to 
information (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2015). The effect of ownership concentration can also 
be viewed from the alignment hypothesis, namely the ability to control shareholders to align 
their interests by monitoring and limiting opportunistic behavior, such as the manipulation of 
financial performance (Fan & Wong, 2002; Huang & Xue, 2016; Bao & Lewellyn, 2017; 
Lassoued et al., 2018). Another previous study by Li et al., (2015) also confirms that 
ownership concentration has an important role in moderating the effectiveness of governance 
so that it can affect company performance. Conclusions about the negative impact of 
concentrated ownership are not always proven, because it is necessary to pay attention to the 
context in which the company under study is located, the party who owns the majority of the 
shares, or the company's ownership structure. 
Within the context of Indonesia, several studies have shown that company ownership 
that is concentrated in certain parties has a positive effect on performance. One example is 
the research of Susilawati & Rakhman (2018) which concluded that companies whose 
majority shares are owned by the government can produce a financial performance that is 
equivalent to that of private companies. Based on the descriptions of these various studies, it 
can be assumed that the effect of ownership concentration may be different if it refers to the 
characteristics of companies in Indonesia, as managers can work more efficiently and 
produce more reliable financial information.
 
H3:  Ownership concentration can strengthen the relationship between managerial ability 
and earnings quality. 
Methods 












The design research of this study was a quantitative approach (empirical study) as the 
objective of this study which aims to test hypotheses based on theory, facts, and previous 
research through statistical procedures. This study was conducted to re-examine the effect of 
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managerial ability on earnings quality by including corporate governance quality and 
ownership concentration as factors that are expected to be able to explain the inconsistencies 
in the results of previous studies. 
The variables used in this study include three types of variables. First is the dependent 
variable, namely earnings quality, which is measured by using accrual quality following the 
modified research (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002). Second is the independent 
variable, namely managerial ability, which is measured based on the MA (managerial ability) 
score (Demerjian et al., 2013). Lastly is two moderating variables, namely corporate 
governance quality, which refers to the studies of Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003) and García 
Lara et al., (2009) is measured based on the aggregate measurement index of the average of 
five components of governance, and ownership concentration, which is measured based on 
the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholders (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Sousa & 
Galdi, 2016). Also, this study used four control variables, including company size, book-to-
market equity ratio, sales growth, and leverage. The use of control variables was intended to 
control or complete the causal relationship between variables or ensure that the results of the 
study are not biased if they do not include several control variables. 
Table 1. The Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Earnings Quality 




MA score of DEA software with output (sales) and input (total assets, 
number of workers, days COGS in inventory, days sales outstanding) 
Corporate Governance 
Quality 
Average of the five components of corporate governance (total audit 
committee, a total board of commissioners, frequency of board meetings, 




% of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
Company Size Natural log of total assets 
Book-to-market Equity Book Value of Equity / Market Value of Equity 
Sales growth (Salest - Salest-1) / Salest-1 
Leverage Total Debt / Total Equity 
 The population of this study was manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The sample used was selected through a purposive sampling technique. Following 
are the sample selection criteria: 1) The manufacturing company was listed on the Indonesia 
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Stock Exchange during 2011-2015, 2) There was a minimum of five companies in each 
manufacturing sub-industry, 3) The company published a complete annual report, and 4) The 
company had the necessary data and information and was related to the variables to be 
studied. 253 observations were obtained, covering 12 sub-industries.  
Table 2. Sample Selection 
Criteria of Sample Selection Total 
Manufacturing companies in the 5 year research period (2011-2015) 865 
Did not meet the minimum requirements for each sub-industry (288) 
Did not publish an annual report (80) 
Did not have complete data and information (239) 
Total sample during the observation period
 258 
Outlier (5) 
Final total observations 253 
 The type of data used was secondary data obtained through several sources, namely the 
OSIRIS database and company annual reports. The first statistical analysis performed was 
classical assumption tests and followed by hypothesis testing. The classical assumption test 
used consisted of a normality test, heteroscedasticity test, autocorrelation test, and 
multicollinearity test. In the independent variable testing, moderation was carried out on the 
dependent variable using multiple regression analysis with the OLS method. This analysis 
served to test the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, including 
examining the relationship between variables so that a model that was appropriate to the 
conditions faced by the researcher could be obtained. Three regression models are used to 
answer the proposed hypotheses of this study.  
EQi,t = β0 + β1MAi,t + β2Sizei,t + β3BMi,t + β4SGi,t + β5LEVi,t + εi,t    (1) 
EQi,t = β0 + β1MAi,t + β2CGi,t + β3(MAi,t * CGi,t ) + β4Sizei,t + β5BMi,t + β6SGi,t  
+ β7LEVi,t + εi,t         (2) 
EQi,t = β0 + β1MAi,t + β2OCi,t + β3(MAi,t * OCi,t ) + β4Sizei,t + β5BMi,t + β6SGi,t  
  + β7LEVi,t + εi,t         (3) 
Annotation: 
EQ  : Quality of accruals for company i in year t 
MA : Managerial ability of company i in year t 
CG  : Corporate governance of company i in year t 
OC  : Ownership concentration of company i in year t 
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Size : Size of company i in year t 
BM : Book-to-market equity ratio of company i in year t 
SG  : Sales growth ratio of company i in year t 
LEV : Leverage ratio of company i in year t 
 To ensure the robustness of the research model, the model should pass all classical 
assumptions testing such as normality, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
multicollinearity. Table 3 shows that the model pass the autocorrelation assumption as the 
results of the Durbin Watson testing shows that the score of Durbin Watson was in the range 
of du < dw < d-du values. All three models were also distributed normally as it has a 
significant value that higher than 0.05 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
Table 3. Autocorrelation and Normality Results 
Autocorrelation 
/ Normality Test 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Criteria Decision 
Durbin Watson 
dU =  1.828 
dW = 2.139 
dU =  1.841 
dW = 2.088 
dU =  1.842 
dW = 2.157 
dU< dW < 4-dU Pass 
Kolmogrov-
Smirnov 
Sig = 0.603 Sig = 0.358 Sig = 0.974 Sig > 0.05 Pass 
 The Glejser test results (Table 4) show that none of the variables in this study was 
significantly influenced the dependent variable of residual absolute as it has a significant 
value that higher than 0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that the three regression models 
did not have heteroscedasticity symptoms. 
Table 4. Heteroscedasticity Results
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
MA -0.051 0.482 -0.094 0.257 -0.113 0.391 
CG - - -0.049 0.131 - - 
MACG - - -0.164 0.221 - - 
OC - - - - 0.057 0.533 
MAOC - - - - 0.169 0.592 
Size 0.004 0.427 0.007 0.162 0.003 0.509 
BM 0.002 0.365 0.002 0.396 0.002 0.360 
SG 0.071 0.229 0.069 0.228 0.094 0.109 
LEV 0.003 0.843 0.003 0.839 0.002 0.898 
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 Table 5 shows that each variable in the three models has a tolerance value > 0.5 and a 
VIF value < 10. These results can be interpreted that there was no multicollinearity in the 
three regression models. 
Table 5. Multicollinearity Results 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
MA 0.942 1.062 0.692 1.444 0.287 3.487 
CG - - 0.684 1.462 - - 
MACG - - 0.523 1.911 - - 
OC - - - - 0.654 1.530 
MAOC - - - - 0.262 3.816 
Size 0.915 1.093 0.781 1.281 0.886 1.128 
BM 0.903 1.107 0.813 1.123 0.894 1.118 
SG 0.984 1.016 0.279 1.017 0.984 1.016 
LEV 0.916 1.092 0.988 1.108 0.911 1.097 
Result and Discussion 
Table 6. Hypotheses Testing 
Model Coefficient
 Sig. Decision 
MA -> EQ -0.377 0.002 H1 Accepted 
MA*CG -> EQ 0.448 0.049 H2 Accepted 
MA*OC -> EQ 0.145 0.785 H3 Rejected 
Table 6 show that there are 2 of 3 hypotheses statement that can be accepted and has 
similar findings to the previous studies. This study support previous study by Djuitaningsih & 
Rahman (2012) which stated that there is a relationship between the ability of management 
and the quality of earning (H1) in a negative way which means that the more-able manager is, 
the more competent they are to produce fewer earnings quality, vice versa. The significant 
values of the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality were lower than 
0.050 (0.002) which means that H1 is accepted.  Table 7 shows that the mean score of 
managerial ability that is close to the value of 1 (0.794) means that the respondent in this 
study can be classified as high managerial ability. On the other side, the mean score of 
earnings quality that is far below the value of 1 (0.094) means that there is a low level of the 
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quality of earnings in this study. Therefore, it can be concluded that the more proficient a 
manager is, the lower the accrual quality will be.     
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Model Mean Std. Deviation 
EQ .0938 .1211 
MA .7944 .25211 
CG -.0023 .62102 
OC .5018 .23362 
Size Rp5,065,723,133 3.74958 
BM .3192 7.73835 
SG .0924 .29405 
LEV 1.0880 1.23333 
The results of this study can also be explained using agency theory. Managers may act 
opportunistically because they get more information than principals; managers have 
flexibility in choosing accounting methods as the flexibility of accounting standards allows 
managers to determine the method to be used from several alternatives. The negative 
influence of reputable managers on earnings quality also can be explained by the rent 
extraction hypothesis, which states that managers with more reputations are more likely to 
use their authority to manipulate earnings to maintain capital market perceptions 
(Djuitaningsih & Rahman, 2012; Abbadi et al., 2016; SeTin & Murwaningsari, 2018). 
Crossland & Hambrick (2007) argues that the size of the manager's influence depends on 
managerial discretion, which itself is determined by organizational factors, meaning that 
when managers are in an environment that lacks limiting authority, the negative effect on 
earnings quality can be increasingly strong. 
This study also proved Mersni & Ben Othman (2016) and Marchini et al. (2018) 
argument which stated that the corporate governance quality will enhance the relationship 
between managerial ability and the quality of earnings (H2). The significant values of the 
relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality with corporate governance play 
as moderators' role were slightly lower than 0.050 (0.049) which means that H2 is accepted. It 
suggested that the corporate governance quality can strengthen the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality because the existence of corporate governance is 
expected to limit the opportunistic behavior of increasingly proficient managers. These 
results confirm that the inconsistency of previous research results can be caused by other 
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factors that can affect the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality, one of 
which is the supervisory mechanism embodied in corporate governance quality. What is 
meant by the supervisory mechanism of corporate governance is that the board of 
commissioners functions to supervise managers, including in the case of asset misuse. The 
audit committee also plays a role in monitoring the effectiveness of internal control and the 
quality of financial reports, ensuring company compliance with regulations (Man & Wong, 
2013). To ascertain whether the presence of the board of commissioners and the audit 
committee has been effective, the number of meetings is an appropriate indicator to assess the 
proficiency of the governance structure in controlling manager behavior. 
Each component of corporate governance when combined as corporate governance 
quality is proven to play an important role in explaining the relationship between managerial 
ability and earnings quality. As explained by Crossland & Hambrick (2007) study that 
confirms that the influence of managers on companies depends on the authority they have, 
and this authority can be influenced by organizational factors, such as strong or weak 
corporate governance. The results of this study are also inseparable from the process of 
improving corporate governance quality in Indonesia. Besides, the corporate governance 
assessment report published by Asian Development Bank (2014) states that several 
companies in Indonesia recorded an increase in their scores, from 84.39 points in 2013 to 
91.98 points in 2014. An example is a case that occurred at PT. Garuda Indonesia, where the 
board of commissioners carried out supervision by refusing to approve the earnings results 
recorded in the financial statements. This situation indicates that managers have the power to 
control financial reports with their authority to determine accounting methods, and this 
authority will be reduced or limited by the supervision of the commissioners who act as part 
of corporate governance.
 
Finally, unlike (Li et al., 2015; Huang & Xue, 2016; Bao & Lewellyn, 2017; Lassoued et 
al., 2018) whom all stated that ownership concentration can enhance the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality, this study concluded the opposite. The role of 
ownership concentration as moderator factors between the relationship of managerial ability 
and earning quality failed to prove in this study. The significant values of the relationship 
between managerial ability and earnings quality with corporate governance as moderators 
were higher than 0.050 (0.785) which means that H3 is rejected.  A possible explanation for 
this result is the lack of incentives for shareholders to actively supervise the managers, as 
stated by (Jung & Kwon, 2002) research that not all shareholders have an incentive to 
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supervise management. The reason could be because their skills are lacking, they are 
constrained by free-rider problems, or they control managers according to their interests.  
In the Indonesian context, not all majority of shareholders have expertise in supervision 
or fully understand the technical conditions of the company. One example is PT. Intikeramik 
Alamsari Industri, which is engaged in the building products industry, whose majority of 
shares were owned by PT. Inti Karya Megah, which is an automotive company. Apart from 
adequate representation of the parties involved in the corporate governance mechanism, the 
supervisory role of the owners is also limited to certain forums, such as the annual General 
Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) or other meetings that are not regularly held. 
 
Conclusion and Suggestion 
 This study was conducted to re-examine the effect of managerial ability on earnings 
quality by including corporate governance quality and ownership concentration as factors that 
are expected to be able to explain the inconsistencies in the results of previous studies. This 
study succeeds in proving the moderation role of governance quality in strengthening the 
relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. However, the role of ownership 
concentration as a moderator factor failed to prove in this study. A possible explanation for 
this result is the lack of incentives for shareholders to actively supervise the managers. 
Interestingly, there is a negative effect between managerial ability and earnings quality. The 
opportunistic actions by managers who want to meet their performance targets were 
considered as the main reason for these negative influences.  
 The implication of this research for the company is that it can function as a consideration 
in manager performance assessment, especially in the managerial ability aspect, and as a 
consideration in choosing managers who are not only proficient but also able play a role in 
aligning organizational goals and maximizing the welfare of stakeholders. Besides, this 
research can encourage regulators to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation and 
formulation of corporate governance policies. Among the limitations of this study is the 
measurement of the DEA score for managerial ability was limited to the manufacturing 
industry and used inputs and outputs that were not following the measurements proposed by 
previous studies. Also, the data obtained were limited and the measurement of governance 
only consisted of a few components. Suggestions for future research are that they consider 
ethical factors in managers and use several measures of earnings quality, such as earnings 
persistence and earnings management, and samples from industries other than the 
manufacturing industry.
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